Without consciousness, nothing can be stably said to be manifest or unmanifest
ṛte kim api eṣām aprakāśamānaṃ
[aprakāśamānam iti nīlāder arthajātasya nīlādirūpataiva yadi prakāśamānatā na punar artha-śarīrottīrṇā prakāśamānatā tarhi yathā jñānānutpāde sarvān prati tan nīlam eva bhaṇyate na kaṃcid vā prati vastuto vā svātmayeva tan nīlaṃ parasya para-niṣṭhatānupapatteḥ svātmany api vā na nīlaṃ nāpy anīlaṃ prakāśānugraheṇa vinā vyavasthānāyogāt tathā aprakāśamānatāpi iti aprakāśamānatā-prasaṅgoparatiḥ |]
“Without that, nothing whatsoever among these can be non-manifest.
[‘Non-manifest’ means this: if, in the case of an object such as blue, manifestation were only its being blue and not manifestation as surpassing the mere body of the object, then, when cognition does not arise, that blue would have to be spoken of as simply blue for everyone, or else for no one at all, or only in itself. But it cannot truly stand as belonging to another, since being established in another is impossible; nor, in itself, can it be said to be either blue or not-blue, because without the favor of manifestation no determination is possible. The same applies to non-manifestation. Thus the whole consequence of asserting non-manifestation collapses.]”
Abhinava is saying: once you separate things from prakāśa, you cannot even speak coherently about their being manifest or unmanifest. Both claims become unstable.
The example of “blue” makes this clearer. If blue were just sitting there in itself, apart from manifestation in consciousness, then what would that even mean? Blue for whom? Blue in what sense? Blue as belonging to itself alone? Even that does not hold, because without manifestation there is no stable determination at all.
That is the real point: appearance is not an optional extra added later to a fully formed thing. Without consciousness, the thing cannot be cleanly fixed even as what it supposedly is.
And Abhinava pushes it one step further. Not only “manifest blue,” but even “unmanifest blue” collapses under the same pressure. Because “unmanifest” is also a determination, and determination itself depends on prakāśa.
So the argument is not merely:
things need consciousness to be known.
It is stronger:
things need consciousness even to be stably speakable as this or that, manifest or unmanifest.
A simple way to put it:
without light, it is not that the object remains fully itself in darkness;
rather, the very claim that it is this definite thing becomes uncertain.
That is why this passage matters. It prepares the next turn toward kaulikī siddhi by establishing that the whole field of objecthood is already inseparable from consciousness.

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