The previous chunk established that the triadic order of nara, śakti, and śiva is not an imposed doctrine but an intrinsic sequence running through cognition, speech, and the universe. But that immediately reopens the problem announced in the verse itself: if everything unfolds in sequence, relation, and expressive articulation, what then is meant by anuttara, the unsurpassable? And more sharply still: how can it be said to be “even beyond uttara,” beyond even what is called higher, answer, or response?
This is the pressure point of the new chunk. Abhinava now explains that even uttara has no independent standing apart from anuttara. Difference rests upon non-difference, and whatever is spoken, thought, or unfolded in sequence has reality only by resting in what surpasses sequence. That is why even the coming textual exposition cannot finally seize anuttara from outside. Whether speech remains undivided as paśyantī, inward as madhyamā, or articulated as vaikharī, it is still a procession or expansion. Anuttara is what these levels presuppose, not what they can contain.
“Hear, O Devi” has already been explained; now the phrase “even beyond the answer” is taken up for clarification
prasaktānuprasaktyā | tat vyākhyātaṃ śṛṇu devi iti | uttarasyāpi iti yaduktaṃ -
kathamanuttaramiti tatra prativacanam
“By way of what was connected and what followed from it, ‘Hear, O Devi’ has already been explained. Now, regarding what was said — ‘even beyond the answer’ — the reply is given to the question: ‘How is it anuttara?’”
Abhinava begins by marking a shift of focus. The phrase śṛṇu devi — “Hear, O Devi” — has already been dealt with as part of the previous flow. So he now turns to the next pressure point in the verse: uttarasyāpi anuttaram. If there is an uttara — an answer, a response, something further or higher — then in what sense can there still be an anuttara, the unsurpassable, beyond even that? This is the question he now explicitly raises and answers.
The phrase prasaktānuprasaktyā is also important. It means that the earlier explanation was given in keeping with what was contextually connected and what naturally followed from it. So Abhinava is not jumping randomly from phrase to phrase. He is following the verse’s own inner pressure. Now that “Hear, O Devi” has served its function, the real difficulty emerges: how can “anuttara” stand even with respect to “uttara”? That is the knot this chunk begins to untie.
So the first point is brief, but exact. It is a turning of the doctrinal lens. The call to listen is behind us; the problem of anuttara now stands fully in front. Abhinava is preparing to show that even what is called uttara has no standing apart from anuttara itself.
Even what is called uttara can exist only by identity with anuttara; otherwise not
uttarasyāpi saṃnihitasya yat anuttaraṃ
prāguktakrameṇa hi uttaramapi anuttaratādātmyenaiva bhavet nānyathā
“And even with regard to what is present as uttara, that which is anuttara [is the truth of it]; for, according to the sequence already explained, even uttara can be only by identity with anuttara, and not otherwise.”
Abhinava now gives the real answer to the question just raised. If there is something called uttara — an answer, a response, a further articulation, a “higher” term — how can there still be anuttara, the unsurpassable, beyond it? His answer is not that uttara stands on one side and anuttara on another. Rather, even uttara has being only through anuttaratādātmya, identity with anuttara. Without that identity, it does not stand at all.
That is the force of nānyathā — “not otherwise.” Uttara is not an independent level with its own self-sufficient reality. If it appears, if it functions, if it can even be called “uttara,” that is only because anuttara is already its ground, truth, and inner being. So Abhinava is not establishing two separate principles, one beyond the other. He is saying that what is called uttara is derivative. Its entire possibility depends on what surpasses it.
This follows the earlier sequence very closely. Abhinava had already shown that what appears lower or more manifest can stand only because a deeper and more ultimate reality has entered it. Here the same logic is applied to the word uttara itself. Even the “answer,” even the articulated response, even what seems to come forth in sequence, has no standing apart from the unsurpassable. The relation is therefore not external. Anuttara is not merely “after” or “above” uttara in a serial sense. It is what makes uttara possible at all.
So the point is very sharp: the moment one imagines that uttara can be grasped in its own right, one has already missed Abhinava’s meaning. It is real only as grounded in anuttara. The unsurpassable is not one further term beyond the answer. It is the truth in virtue of which anything like answer, articulation, or higherness can arise in the first place.
Therefore, by disregarding “uttara,” even the form called “uttara” is really only anuttara in which that answer-status has been disregarded
ata eva uttaramapi anādṛtya anādare ṣaṣṭhī uttaraṃ rūpaṃ hi anādṛtatadbhāvamanuttararūpameva
[anādṛtottarabhāvam |]
“Therefore, even ‘uttara,’ when disregarded — the genitive being used in the sense of disregard — the form called ‘uttara’ is in fact only the form of anuttara, in which that status of being ‘uttara’ has been disregarded [that is, its uttara-condition has been set aside].”
Abhinava now sharpens the point grammatically and doctrinally at once. Since uttara has no standing apart from identity with anuttara, one may even disregard the very status of “uttara.” Then what remains is not some second thing left over after the answer has been stripped away. What remains is precisely anuttara. The form called uttara is real only so long as it rests in that deeper ground; once its separate claim is ignored, its truth shows itself as nothing but anuttara.
That is why he notes the force of the genitive here as one of anādara, disregard. The point is subtle. He is not merely saying “beyond uttara” in a vague superior sense, as though anuttara were just one rung higher. He is saying that the very uttara-bhāva, the condition of being an answer, a further term, a relative higherness, can be set aside. And when that is done, the so-called uttara-rūpa is seen to be only anuttara-rūpa. In other words, its real being never belonged to its status as “answer” at all.
So the movement here is very clean. First Abhinava said: even uttara exists only by identity with anuttara. Now he says: therefore, if the separate dignity of uttara is simply not granted, nothing essential is lost. On the contrary, its truth becomes clearer. What looked like a distinct “answer” or “higher term” is revealed as only a dependent presentation of the unsurpassable itself. This is why anuttara is not merely the last member of a sequence. It is what remains when the whole pretension of sequence, answerhood, and relative higherness is no longer given independent weight.
Difference itself rests upon the ground of non-difference; without assimilating the other, one cannot truly determine it
bhedo hi ayamuttararūpo nitarāmeva
abhedabhuvamadhiśayya [adhiśayya - āśritya | tathā - bhedarūpatayā |] tathā bhavet |
yathoktaṃ
paravyavasthāpi [paravyavasthā - bhedaniyamaḥ | pare - bhinnapadārthe |] pare
yāvannātmīkṛtaḥ paraḥ |
tāvanna śakyate kartuṃ yato'buddhaḥ paraḥ paraḥ ||
“For this difference, this form called uttara, comes to be only by resting firmly upon the ground of non-difference [that is, by depending on it, even while appearing in the form of difference]. As it has been said:
‘Even the determination of the other [that is, the fixing of difference with regard to a distinct object] cannot be made until the other has been made one’s own; for so long as the other is not understood, it remains merely other, other.’”
Abhinava now states the underlying principle. Bheda, difference, including this form called uttara, does not stand by itself. It comes to be only by adhiśayya, resting upon, depending on, the abheda-bhu, the ground of non-difference. So even when something appears as distinct, articulated, and set apart, its very possibility depends on a deeper unity that supports it.
That is why he cites the verse about the “other.” One cannot truly determine the other as other until it has somehow been ātmīkṛta, made one’s own, inwardly assimilated. Otherwise it remains only a blank externality — “other, other” — not truly known. This is very subtle and very important. Real knowledge of difference is not produced by staying at sheer distance. It arises only when the apparently separate thing is grounded in a deeper identity within consciousness.
So the point is severe: difference is real, but derivative. It can function only because non-difference is already there beneath it. This is why uttara cannot claim independent standing. If even the determination of an ordinary distinct object depends on prior assimilation into awareness, how much more must uttara itself depend on anuttara. The articulated rests on the unarticulated; the distinct rests on the non-distinct.
Even the forthcoming portion of the text cannot cross over and determine anuttara from outside
tathā uttarasyāpi [uttarasyāpīti vakṣyamāṇasya | anuttaram - uttīrṇam |]
granthabhāgasya anuttaraṃ tenāpi uttarītuṃ na śakyate
“And likewise, even with regard to the forthcoming portion of the text: anuttara — that which is beyond — cannot be crossed over or determined even by that.”
Abhinava now turns the argument back onto the very exposition he is giving. Not only does uttara in general have no independent standing apart from anuttara; even the coming granthabhāga, the very textual portion that is about to unfold, cannot itself cross over and seize anuttara from outside. The text can indicate, unfold, gesture, and clarify — but it cannot stand apart from anuttara and then master it as an object.
That is the force of anuttaram — uttīrṇam in the gloss: anuttara is that which is beyond, that which has already surpassed. What has already surpassed cannot be overtaken by discursive exposition. The text belongs to the side of unfolding, sequence, statement, and determination. Anuttara is the ground on which such unfolding stands, not something later captured by it.
So this is a very important turn in the chunk. Abhinava is placing a limit on scripture, commentary, and even his own unfolding. The teaching is real and necessary, but it does not produce anuttara as a conclusion. Nor does it cross into it as though entering a separate territory. At best, the text can remove confusion and point back toward that which always already exceeds it. That is why the next move into paśyantī, madhyamā, and vaikharī becomes necessary: even these levels of speech belong to procession, and therefore none of them can finally contain what is beyond all procession.
Even paśyantī cannot determine anuttara from outside
paśyantyā [paśyantyā apīti
vimarśasatattvaṃ hi prakāśatattvaṃ sa eva vimarśaḥ prathamaprasararūpaḥ | yaduktam
avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā |
svarūpajyotirevāntaḥ sūkṣmā dhāgatrapāyinī ||]
“Nor can it be done by paśyantī. [For the essence of vimarśa is indeed the essence of prakāśa; that very prakāśa, as vimarśa, is the first form of expansion. As it has been said:
‘Paśyantī is undivided, with all sequence withdrawn on every side, inward, subtle, moving within the radiance of its own nature.’]”
Abhinava now moves from the forthcoming text to a subtler level of speech itself. One might think: granted, gross textual expression cannot determine anuttara from outside, but perhaps paśyantī, the inward and undivided level of speech, can do so. Abhinava says no. Even paśyantī cannot overtake anuttara.
The reason is precise. Paśyantī is indeed far subtler than articulated speech. It is avibhāgā, undivided; sarvataḥ saṃhṛta-kramā, with sequence withdrawn; inward, subtle, resting in the radiance of its own nature. And yet it is still described as prathama-prasara-rūpa — the first form of expansion. That is the key. However subtle, however close to the source, paśyantī is still a prasara, an emergence, an unfolding. It belongs to manifestation. It is not outside anuttara, but precisely because it is an emergence from it, it cannot stand apart and determine it as an object.
So Abhinava’s point becomes even sharper here. The issue is not simply that coarse language fails. Even the most inward luminous vibration of speech is still already a movement. Anuttara is what that movement presupposes. Paśyantī may be very near the source, but it is still not the source as objectifiable from outside. That is why even here, at this extremely subtle level, determination fails.
That same current appears in the mind as vivakṣā and intention to convey meaning; this is called madhyamā
saiva cārthapratipādanecchārūpavivakṣāsvarūpe manasi vijñānarūpe vartate yā
madhyameti kathyate iyaṃ ca nityaṃ prāṇāpānantare sarvasādhāraṇaiketi | yaduktam
āste vijñānarūpatve sa śabdo'tra vivakṣayā |
madhyamā kathyate saiva bindunādamarutkramāt ||
“And that very same [power], when it abides in the mind in the form of vivakṣā — the intention to convey meaning — and as cognitive awareness, is called madhyamā. And this, abiding always between inhalation and exhalation, is the one thing common to all. As it has been said:
‘That very word, abiding in the form of cognition, is here called madhyamā by reason of vivakṣā, through the sequence of bindu, nāda, and breath.’”
Abhinava now moves from paśyantī to madhyamā. It is still the same current — saiva, that very same power — but now it is present in the mind as vivakṣā, the intention to express or convey meaning, and as vijñānarūpa, cognitive form. So what was previously described as undivided inward speech now takes on a more determinate interior shape. It has not yet become outward articulated language, but it has already turned toward meaningful expression.
This is why it is called madhyamā, the middle level. It stands between the still more compact inwardness of paśyantī and the full outward articulation of vaikharī. Meaning is already intended here; speech is already inwardly formed here; but it has not yet broken into audible differentiated phonemes. Abhinava also adds that this level is sarvasādhāraṇaikā, common to all, and always present between prāṇa and apāna, inhalation and exhalation. So madhyamā is not a rare special event. It is the ordinary inner matrix of meaningful speech as such.
But the main point of the chunk remains unchanged: even this cannot determine anuttara from outside. Madhyamā is subtler than articulated speech, but it is still a mode of procession, an inner formation, an intention-bearing movement. It belongs to the unfolding current. Therefore it too presupposes anuttara rather than grasping it as an object.
Again, when it reaches the vocal channel and differentiated phonemes, it is called vaikharī; the text itself is of that form
punarapi ca saiva vaktranāḍyāṃ prāptā
kaṇṭhādisthānavibhaktakakārādivarṇāsādhāraṇā vaikharītyucyate saiva
grantharūpeti ityatastakṣyaitatprasararūpatvāt kathaṃ tena nirṇetuṃ śakyate
“And again, when that very same [power] reaches the vocal channel, and becomes shared with differentiated phonemes such as ka, divided according to places like the throat and the rest, it is called vaikharī. That itself is the form of the text. Therefore, since this too is only of the nature of an outward unfolding, how could anuttara be decisively determined by it?”
Abhinava now moves to the most external level of speech. The same current that was inward as paśyantī and mental-intentional as madhyamā now reaches the vaktra-nāḍī, the vocal channel. There it becomes articulated into distinct phonemes — ka and the rest — differentiated by their places of production, throat and so on. At that point it is called vaikharī, outward speech.
Then he adds the crucial sentence: saiva grantharūpā — that itself is the form of the text. In other words, the very scripture, commentary, and articulated teaching we are reading belong to vaikharī. This is a very sober move. The text is not outside speech; it is one of its most explicit forms. It is shaped, divided, sequential, phonemic, extended in expression.
That is why the question lands so sharply: kathaṃ tena nirṇetuṃ śakyate — how could anuttara be decisively determined by that? Since vaikharī is still prasara-rūpa, a mode of unfolding or expansion, it cannot finally grasp what is beyond all such unfolding. The text is necessary, powerful, and revelatory in its own order, but Abhinava refuses to flatter it. It can indicate anuttara; it cannot contain or overtake it.
Supporting verse: vaikharī is bound to the movement of breath and articulated through distinct places of sound
uktaṃ ca
sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛtavarṇaparigrahā |
vaiharī vāk prayoktṛṇāṃ prāṇavṛttinibandhanā ||
“And it has also been said:
‘When the breath has opened out in the places of articulation and taken on the phonemes, that speech of speakers is called vaikharī, bound to the activity of breath.’”
Abhinava now seals the previous point with a supporting verse on vaikharī. The description is very concrete. Speech at this level depends on vāyu, the moving breath; it unfolds through sthānas, the places of articulation; and it takes on varṇas, distinct phonemes. This is outward speech in its fully expressed state — audible, articulated, differentiated.
That is exactly why it cannot finally determine anuttara. Vaikharī is already bound to sequence, bodily process, and expressed differentiation. It depends on the movement of breath — prāṇavṛtti-nibandhanā. So however necessary and powerful it may be, it remains an outwardly unfolded mode. It belongs to manifestation in its explicit articulated form. Therefore the text, which is of the nature of vaikharī, can indicate anuttara, but cannot overtake it or pin it down from outside.
So this verse does not merely define a speech-level. It closes the whole argument of this stretch. Even the most refined exposition, once it stands as articulated speech, belongs to a dependent unfolding. Anuttara is the ground from which that unfolding comes, not the object it can finally master.

No comments:
Post a Comment