 |
| Buddhist monks with “nirvana” merchandise |
Previous part completed Abhinava’s own argument: vikalpa cannot stand independently. Conceptual cognition depends on avikalpa, convention depends on memory, memory depends on prior experience, and all determinate cognition ultimately arises from one unlimited pārameśvarī pratibhā. Now the text turns toward the Buddhist view, but not as a cheap opponent to be dismissed.
This matters because Abhinava rarely pauses in this way to unfold another tradition’s position at length. Here he brings in one of the strongest Buddhist insights: the non-separability of object and cognition, especially expressed through sahopalambha-niyama, the necessary co-apprehension of blue and the cognition of blue. If blue were truly separate from cognition, it should be apprehended apart from cognition. But it never is. What is actually given is always blue-as-known, blue-as-appearing.
Abhinava can agree with the force of this. The Buddhist blade cuts through naïve realism: the object is not a self-standing inert thing outside cognition. The apparent division into grāhya, grāhaka, and saṃvitti — grasped, grasper, and cognition — is not ultimately solid. In that respect, the Buddhist argument is not merely useful; it is genuinely powerful. A tradition that has produced saints, philosophers, and contemplatives for millennia is not being treated here as foolish. It has seen something real.
But Abhinava will not stop where the Buddhist view stops. The Buddhist account moves toward jñānamātra or saṃvinmātra: cognition-only, the dissolution of grasper-grasped duality, and liberation through seeing the lack of separate objecthood. Abhinava accepts the cut against external objecthood, but he carries it further into the Śaiva center: pārameśvarī pratibhā, prakāśa-vimarśa, living self-apprehending consciousness as sovereign creative power.
So this chunk should be read with respect and tension. It is not yet Abhinava’s full siddhānta, but neither is it merely wrong. It is a powerful partial truth that prepares the way for the deeper Trika unfolding.
If brutally honest, it feels close to Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī style — dense epistemology, inference structure, Buddhist positions, cognition/object non-difference, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, vipakṣa, sahopalambha-niyama. It becomes almost surgical.
The reason it may feel dry is that he is doing necessary demolition work. Before he can say, with full force, that all determinate cognition arises from pārameśvarī pratibhā, he has to prevent crude realism from sneaking back in. So he uses the Buddhist blade to cut the idea of objects standing apart from cognition. Experientially, this is heavy. Very little nectar here. More like bone saw.
The good news: this section is a temporary analytic tunnel. Once he reaches: siddhaṃ tāvat hy etat he starts extracting the result and returning to prātibha, parāśakti, glāni, Spanda, mala — still technical, but more alive and closer to the heart of the Vivarana.
If an object appeared separately from cognition, it should be apprehended apart from cognition
tathā ceti itthaṃ tanmataṃ - yadi hi jñānādarthaḥ pṛthagavabhāsitātmā bhavet jñānamantareṇāpi asāvupalabhyeta (?)
“And the sense of that view is as follows: if an object had a nature appearing separately from cognition, then it should be apprehended even apart from cognition.”
The Buddhist argument begins with a clean challenge. If an artha, an object, really has an appearing nature separate from jñāna, cognition, then it should be possible to apprehend that object apart from cognition. If blue truly stands as something independently appearing outside the cognition of blue, then blue should somehow be available without that cognition.
But that never happens. We never encounter an object outside appearing. We never grasp blue apart from the cognition in which blue appears. The supposed object outside cognition is assumed, but not directly found. What is actually given is always object-as-known, object-as-appearing, object inseparable from the cognitive event.
This is the force of the Buddhist move. It does not begin with a mystical claim. It begins with disciplined phenomenological pressure: show me the object apart from cognition. If you cannot, then do not pretend that its separate appearing has been established.
A simple example: someone says, “There is blue outside cognition.” The Buddhist asks: how do you know that blue? If you say “I see it,” then blue is already within seeing. If you say “I infer it,” then it is within inference. If you say “I remember it,” then it is within memory. In every case, the object is never found nakedly apart from cognition. It is always given through some mode of knowing.
So the first Buddhist point cuts against naïve realism. The object is not simply sitting outside as a self-revealed thing, later copied by cognition. If it appears, it appears in cognition. That insight is powerful, and Abhinava is allowing it its full force before moving beyond it.
Since this never occurs, cognition and object are non-different
na caivamasti tasmādabheda eva jñānārthayoriti |
“But this is not so. Therefore, cognition and object are indeed non-different.”
The Buddhist argument now draws its conclusion. If the object truly appeared separately from cognition, it should be apprehensible apart from cognition. But na ca evam asti — this is not the case. No object is ever found outside knowing. Therefore, jñāna and artha, cognition and object, are abheda, non-different.
This does not mean that ordinary distinctions simply vanish at the practical level. The Buddhist is not saying that blue and yellow are the same conventional appearance, or that the world becomes a meaningless blur. The point is more exact: the object, precisely as appearing, cannot be separated from the cognition in which it appears. The “object apart from cognition” is an imagined remainder, not something actually encountered.
This is why the argument is strong. It does not ask us to believe a metaphysical dogma first. It asks us to inspect experience. Where is the object apart from cognition? If every attempt to find it already occurs through perception, inference, memory, or thought, then the object’s supposed separateness is never directly established.
For Abhinava, this is a valuable cut. It breaks the crude idea that cognition is one thing and the object is another self-standing thing merely illuminated afterward. But the Śaiva account will not stop at jñāna-artha-abheda in a thin sense. Abhinava will press further toward the living nature of that cognition: not inert awareness, not mere objectless cognition, but self-apprehending saṃvid, luminous with vimarśa.
Blue and the cognition of blue are always apprehended together
yadāhuḥ
sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ |
iti |
“As they have said:
‘Because of the necessary co-apprehension, there is non-difference between blue and the cognition of blue.’”
The Buddhist position is now supported by the famous principle of sahopalambha-niyama — necessary co-apprehension. Nīla, blue, and tad-dhī, the cognition of blue, are never found separately. Wherever blue is apprehended, the cognition of blue is present. Wherever the cognition of blue is present, blue is present as its appearing form. They arise together in experience.
This is not a loose association. The verse says niyama, necessity. Blue is not first found outside cognition and then later connected to cognition. Nor is cognition first found as an empty container and then later filled with blue. In actual apprehension, blue and blue-cognition are given together. Therefore the Buddhist concludes: abhedaḥ — they are non-different.
A simple way to see it: try to isolate “blue” from the seeing of blue. The moment you point to blue, it is seen, remembered, imagined, or thought. You never get blue as a self-standing thing outside all cognition. Likewise, a cognition of blue without any blue-appearance is not a cognition of blue. The two are inseparable in the act of appearing.
This is why the Buddhist argument is dangerous to naïve realism. It attacks the hidden assumption that there is an object fully established outside cognition and then a separate cognition that comes to know it. The Buddhist says: in actual experience, that split is never given. What is given is blue-as-known, blue-as-appearing. And because that co-apprehension is necessary, blue and the cognition of blue cannot be ultimately divided.
Cognition alone appears everywhere in various ways
tasmājjñānameva sarvatra tathā tathā pratibhāti na tadvayatirikto nāma kaściditi
“Therefore, cognition alone appears everywhere in this or that way; there is nothing whatsoever apart from it.”
The Buddhist conclusion now expands from the example of blue. Since blue and the cognition of blue are necessarily co-apprehended, the same logic applies everywhere. What appears as this object or that object is, in truth, jñāna itself appearing tathā tathā — in various modes, in this way and that way.
The phrase na tad-vyatiriktaḥ nāma kaścit is strong: there is nothing at all apart from cognition. The supposed external object, standing independently outside cognition, is not found. What is found is cognition appearing under different forms: blue-form, yellow-form, object-form, grasper-form, memory-form, and so on.
This is the powerful Buddhist reduction. The world of objects is not denied as appearance, but its supposed separateness from cognition is denied. There are appearances, yes. But they are not established as something outside jñāna. They are jñāna appearing in varied ways.
From Abhinava’s standpoint, this is close and serious. It rightly refuses inert objecthood outside cognition. But the Śaiva question will still remain: what is the nature of this jñāna? Is it merely cognition appearing without external object, or is it the living self-apprehending consciousness of prakāśa-vimarśa? The Buddhist view has cut one illusion, but Abhinava will not let the cutting stop before the full heart of consciousness is revealed.
Object, means of knowledge, and result are completed within cognition alone
jñāna eva ca ekatrāyaṃ prameyapramāṇapramitivyavahāraḥ samāpyate iti
“And within cognition alone, in one place, this practical distinction of object, means of knowledge, and cognition-result is completed.”
The Buddhist position now explains how ordinary epistemic life can still function if there is nothing apart from jñāna. One might object: if cognition alone appears, then what happens to the normal structure of knowing — the object known, the means by which it is known, and the result of knowledge? The answer is: all of that is completed within jñāna itself.
This is the force of jñāna eva ekatra — in cognition alone, in one place. The whole triad of prameya, the knowable object; pramāṇa, the means of knowledge; and pramiti, the completed cognition or result, does not require three separate substances standing apart from one another. The distinction works conventionally, but it is internal to cognition.
A simple example: when blue appears, we ordinarily say: blue is the object, seeing is the means, and the knowledge “blue is seen” is the result. The Buddhist says: do not mistake this useful distinction for ultimate separation. The “blue,” the “seeing,” and the “knowing” are different functional aspects within one cognitive event.
This is why the Buddhist view is subtle. It does not simply destroy ordinary language. It explains ordinary language as vyavahāra, practical functioning. At the practical level, we can speak of object, means, and result. But ultimately, that whole structure is contained within cognition itself. The triad is not denied as function; it is denied as separate reality.
Object, means, and result are cognition’s object-form, grasper-form, and self-cognition
tasya hi viṣayākāratā prameyaṃ grāhakākāraṇatā pramāṇaṃ svasaṃvittiśca phalamiti |
“For its taking the form of the object is the prameya; its taking the form of the grasper is the pramāṇa; and its self-cognition is the result.”
The Buddhist view now specifies how the whole triad works inside cognition. Jñāna itself takes different functional forms. When it appears as the object-form — viṣaya-ākāratā — that is called prameya, the knowable. When it appears as the grasper-form — grāhaka-ākāraṇatā — that is called pramāṇa, the means of knowledge. And when it knows itself — svasaṃvitti — that is the phala, the result.
This is very compressed, but the idea is clean. The Buddhist is saying: do not multiply realities unnecessarily. The object, the means of knowing, and the result are not three independent entities. They are three aspects of one cognitive event.
Take the cognition of blue. The blue-appearance is the object-aspect. The knowing-function that grasps it is the means-aspect. The cognition’s self-presentation is the result. But all three are internal to jñāna. There is no need to posit a separate external blue, then a separate instrument of knowing, then a separate result floating somewhere afterward.
This is why the Buddhist position is so close to Abhinava’s concerns. It refuses dead external objecthood and insists that the entire structure of knowing must be understood within cognition. But again, Abhinava will eventually ask a deeper question: what is this svasaṃvitti? Is it merely reflexive cognition in the Buddhist sense, or is it the full self-apprehending power of saṃvid, inseparable from vimarśa and sovereignty? That difference will matter.
Object, means, and result are not separate from cognition
yathoktaṃ
yadābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tatpramāṇaṃ phalate punaḥ |
grāhakākārasaṃvittyostrayaṃ nātaḥ pṛthakkṛtam ||
“As it has been said:
‘That which appears is the prameya; again, the pramāṇa bears fruit through the forms of grasper and self-cognition. Therefore, the three are not made separate from this.’”
The supporting verse now confirms the Buddhist account of the epistemic triad. Yad-ābhāsam — whatever appears — is called prameya, the object known. The pramāṇa, the means of knowledge, bears fruit through grāhaka-ākāra, the form of the grasper, and saṃvitti, self-cognition. Therefore the three — object, means, and result — are not ultimately separated from cognition.
This verse is doing the same work as the previous prose, but with greater compression. The Buddhist is not denying practical distinctions. There is still an object-aspect, a grasper-aspect, and a result-aspect. But these are not three independent realities. They are internal differentiations within the single movement of cognition.
So, in the cognition of blue, the blue-appearance functions as prameya. The grasper-form functions as pramāṇa. The self-cognition of that event functions as phala, the result. But all of this remains within jñāna. Nothing has to be posited outside cognition in order for knowing to function.
This is the strength of the Buddhist view here. It preserves vyavahāra, ordinary epistemic activity, without granting ultimate separateness to object, knower, and knowledge. The triad works, but it works as a structure within cognition itself. That is why the verse concludes that the three are not separate.
Cognition appears divided because beginningless ignorance distorts vision
tadidamanādyavidyāvāsanāvilāsaviparyāsitatattvadarśanatayā jñānameva grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittibhedavadiva lakṣyate
“Thus this very cognition alone appears as if divided into grasped, grasper, and cognition, because the vision of reality has been distorted by the play of beginningless ignorance and latent tendencies.”
The Buddhist view now explains why, if cognition alone is ultimately present, we nevertheless experience a split between object, subject, and knowing. The answer is anādi-avidyā-vāsanā-vilāsa — the play of beginningless ignorance and latent tendencies. Because of this, tattva-darśana, the seeing of reality, becomes distorted or inverted.
So jñāna eva — cognition alone — appears grāhya-grāhaka-saṃvitti-bhedavat iva, as if it possessed the division of grasped object, grasping subject, and cognition. The word iva matters. It is “as if.” The division appears, functions, and structures ordinary experience, but from this Buddhist standpoint it is not ultimately real.
This is the heart of the Buddhist diagnosis. The problem is not merely that we make occasional mistakes. The ordinary structure of experience itself is already shaped by avidyā and vāsanā. We do not simply see cognition and then accidentally mislabel it. We inherit a deep tendency to experience the field as split: “I here, object there, knowing between us.” That division feels natural because the latent tendencies are beginningless.
This is also why this section feels so dry and surgical. Abhinava is letting the Buddhist position carry its own blade: what we take as normal perception is already distorted by a deep structural habit. The grasper-grasped split is not the final truth of experience; it is the way cognition appears when reality-vision is bent by ignorance.
For our purposes, the important point is this: the Buddhist view is not denying that the split appears. It is denying that the split is ultimately true. Object, subject, and cognition are practical distinctions inside the distorted display of jñāna. When the distortion ceases, the next point will say, cognition becomes clear in itself.
When ignorance ceases, cognition becomes clear by itself
avidyāviratau tu svacchamevaitat saṃpadyate na kiṃcidveti |
“But when ignorance ceases, this becomes clear by itself — or rather, nothing separate remains at all.”
The Buddhist view now gives the release-side of the argument. If the apparent division into grāhya, grāhaka, and saṃvitti arises because of beginningless avidyā and vāsanā, then when avidyā ceases, that distortion no longer holds. What remains is svaccha, clear, transparent, unobstructed cognition.
The phrase na kiṃcid vā is severe. It does not mean crude nihilism, as though absolutely nothing exists in a simplistic sense. It means that nothing remains as a separately established object outside cognition. The imagined split collapses. There is no independent grāhya standing apart, no separate grāhaka grasping it from elsewhere, no third thing called cognition mediating between the two. The whole divided structure loses its false solidity.
So the Buddhist position here is very powerful: bondage is distorted seeing; liberation is the clearing of that distortion. When ignorance ceases, cognition no longer appears as fractured into subject, object, and knowing. It becomes clear in itself.
This is also where Abhinava can agree deeply, but not finally. He can accept the cutting away of false division. He can accept that the object is not separate from cognition, and that the grasper-grasped structure is not ultimately solid. But he will not let the final word be merely “clear cognition” or “nothing separate remains.” For him, the clear ground is not just emptied cognition; it is living saṃvid, radiant with vimarśa, sovereign Parāśakti.
The Buddhist conclusion: cognition alone shines, and seeing this leads to fearless nirvāṇa
taduktaṃ
nānyo'nubhāvo buddhyāstu tasyānānubhavaḥ paraḥ |
grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryātsvayaṃ saiva prakāśate ||
iti | tathā
avibhāgo'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ |
grāhyagrahakasaṃvittibhedavāniva lakṣyate ||
ityartharūparahitaṃ saṃvinmātraṃ kiledamiti paśyat |
parihṛtya duḥkhasantatimabhayaṃ nirvāṇamāpnoti ||
iti saugatamatam |
“And it has been said:
‘There is no experience other than cognition; nor is there any further experience of that. Devoid of grasped and grasper, cognition itself shines by itself.’
And likewise:
‘Although the nature of cognition is undivided, by those whose vision is distorted it is perceived as if divided into grasped, grasper, and cognition.’
Thus, seeing this as mere consciousness, devoid of object-form, one abandons the stream of suffering and attains fearless nirvāṇa.
Such is the Buddhist view.”
The Buddhist presentation now reaches its conclusion. First, it states that there is no anubhava, no experience, apart from buddhi, cognition. Nor is there another experience standing behind cognition to experience it from outside. Cognition itself shines — svayaṃ saiva prakāśate. Once the structure of grāhya and grāhaka, grasped and grasper, is removed, cognition does not need another witness to reveal it. It is self-shining.
Then the next verse restates the same point from the side of error. The nature of cognition is avibhāga, undivided. Yet those whose seeing is distorted — viparyāsita-darśana — perceive it as if it were divided into grāhya, grāhaka, and saṃvitti: grasped object, grasping subject, and cognition. Again the iva is essential: “as if.” The division appears, but it is not ultimately true.
The final verse gives the Buddhist soteriological conclusion. One sees: artharūpa-rahitaṃ saṃvinmātraṃ kila idam — this is mere consciousness, devoid of object-form. Seeing in this way, one abandons duḥkha-santati, the stream of suffering, and attains abhayaṃ nirvāṇam, fearless nirvāṇa.
So the Buddhist view closes with real force. The object is not outside cognition. The grasper-grasped split is distortion. Cognition shines by itself. Seeing this cuts the stream of suffering.
But the final phrase iti saugatamatam must stay visible. This is the Buddhist position as presented here. Abhinava can accept much of its blade — especially its dismantling of external objecthood and crude subject-object realism. But he will not stop at saṃvinmātra understood as mere objectless cognition. His next movement will take what has been established and return to prātibha, Parāśakti, Spanda, and the living self-apprehending power of consciousness.
So this chunk closes not with a cheap refutation, but with a boundary. The Buddhist view is powerful, disciplined, and liberating in its own terms. Yet for Abhinava it remains a near-truth, not the final truth. It clears the ground; it does not yet reveal the full sovereign heart of saṃvid.
No comments:
Post a Comment