Parātrīṃśikā Vivaraṇa (Part 91): Limitation as Śakti’s Causative Touch

The hand above can represent Īśvara / Śakti as causative power — not forcing from outside, but touching, directing, activating. The meditating figure below represents the puṃs, the limited subject, or the field of finite experience. The light between them  represents prakāśa and dhāraṇā: what is already shining is held, shaped, and made capable of differentiated experience.

Previous ended by establishing the central mechanism of manifestation: the world appears as differentiated idam, but never apart from the luminous ahamātman. The knowable is Self-made; the knower too is Self-made. Therefore the relation of vedya and vedaka, known and knower, is not imposed on Īśvara from outside. Īśvara abides in himself with the powers by which he can assume differentiated knower-known experience.

Current movement asks: what are those powers?

The answer is sharp: rāga and the other limiting powers. They are not accidental defects added later from outside the divine field. They are the very powers by which Īśvara becomes capable of that specific mode of manifestation where knower and known stand apart. Desire, limited knowledge, limited agency, and separative differentiation become the causative forces that make the divine “I” enter the structure of finite experience.

This is why the grammar becomes important. Abhinava is still explaining dhāraṇā and the double causative force implied in the word. These powers are called dhāraṇās not simply because they “hold” tattvas in a flat sense, but because they causatively help Īśvara hold bhāvas as differentiated, knowable, and experienceable. They make the ordered world of finite cognition possible.

The final support from Abhinava’s Śivadṛṣṭyālocana and Bhartṛhari is not a decorative grammar lesson. It protects the logic: a causative applies only where there is already capacity or activity. You cannot command a stone to understand. You cannot cause what has no capacity to function. Therefore, when rāga and the others become causative toward Īśvara, they do not impose something alien on him. They activate a power already present in him: the capacity to appear as differentiated knower and known.

So this part is subtle but crucial. It explains how limitation can arise without ceasing to belong to divine power. The finite condition is not outside Śakti. It is Śakti functioning through the precise causative powers that hold manifestation as a structured field of experience.

Rāga and the other limiting powers make Īśvara capable of differentiated cognition

rāgādibhireva ca tathāvidhatvamasyeti

“And it is precisely through rāga and the others that he has this capacity.”

Abhinava now names the powers implied at the end of the previous part. Īśvara abides in himself with powers by which he can assume the differentiated condition of knower and known. Now we are told what those powers are: rāga and the others — the limiting powers that belong to the subtle structure of finite experience.

This is a delicate point. Rāga, vidyā, kalā, māyā, and the related limiting powers are usually understood as contractions: desire, limited knowledge, limited agency, differentiation. But here Abhinava is not treating them as alien defects outside the divine. They are the very powers by which Īśvara becomes capable of this specific manifestation: the appearance of differentiated knowing.

This is one of Abhinava’s bold moves. Limitation is not outside the divine totality. He does not treat the powers of contraction as a second principle standing beside the Absolute. But neither does he treat them merely as an indefinable appearance to be dismissed once the highest truth is known. In Advaita Vedānta, Māyā is not ultimately independent of Brahman, but world-appearance is typically understood as dependent, provisional, and finally sublated in Brahman. Abhinava’s Śaiva move is more affirmative: even the powers that make limitation possible are Śakti. They are not outside the Lord’s freedom; they are modes of that freedom.

Without them, there would be no stable field of finite cognition. No “I know this.” No “this is desirable.” No “I can do this much.” No partial knowledge. No separated object-field. The limited world is possible because these powers shape the relation between vedaka, knower, and vedya, knowable.

So tathāvidhatva means “being of such a kind” — being capable of entering that differentiated mode. Īśvara does not become finite because something outside overpowers him. He becomes capable of finite manifestation through his own Śaktis, functioning as rāga and the rest.

The finite condition is not a second kingdom outside the Lord. It is the Lord’s own power taking on the structure of knower and known.

Rāga and the others become causative toward Īśvara

rāgādaya eva ādhriyamānān bhāvān uktanyāyena dhārayantam īśvaraṃ prati prayojakatāṃ gacchanti

“Thus rāga and the others become causative toward Īśvara, who, according to the reasoning already stated, holds the bhāvas that are being held.”

Abhinava now makes the causative relation explicit. Rāga and the other limiting powers do not merely exist somewhere in the tattva-list. They become prayojaka, causative, toward Īśvara. They are the powers through which Īśvara is brought into the specific function of holding differentiated bhāvas as the field of finite experience.

The phrase ādhriyamānān bhāvān dhārayantam īśvaram is dense. The bhāvas are already being held — ādhriyamānān — according to the reasoning previously established: they shine in the luminous Self and are not outside consciousness. But Īśvara also “holds” them in a further sense, dhārayantam, making them stand as structured, knowable, differentiated realities.

So there are two levels. First, all bhāvas are held in light, because they appear only in prakāśa. Second, through rāga and the other limiting powers, they are held as the finite field of knower and known. These powers cause the transition from sheer luminous containment to structured differentiated experience.

This is why Abhinava is so careful with causative grammar. The powers of limitation do not create something outside Īśvara. They cause Īśvara’s own holding-power to function in a specific mode. The divine field becomes capable of appearing as the finite world: desirable objects, limited knowing, partial agency, separation, relation, lack, pursuit.

So rāga and the others are not accidental stains on an otherwise pure system. They are the causative Śaktis by which the world becomes experienceable as differentiated. Bondage is not outside the divine mechanism. It is the divine holding-power functioning under the mode of limitation.

These powers become the cause of the designation “puṃs” and are called dhāraṇās

atastasyaiva puṃstvavyapadeśakāraṇaikabhūtā dvitīye ṇici utpanne dhāraṇaśabdavācyāḥ

“Therefore, when the second causative arises, these very powers — being the sole cause for designating him as puṃs — are denoted by the word dhāraṇa.”

Abhinava now explains why rāga and the others receive the name dhāraṇā. These powers become prayojaka, causative, toward Īśvara as he holds the bhāvas in differentiated form. Therefore, when the second causative force is taken into account, they become dhāraṇaśabda-vācyāḥ — what is meant by the word dhāraṇa.

The phrase puṃstva-vyapadeśa-kāraṇaika-bhūtāḥ is important. These powers are the cause for designating him as puṃs, the limited subject or individual experiencer. Īśvara, in himself, is not a helpless finite being. But through rāga, vidyā, kalā, māyā, and the related powers, the structure of limited subjectivity becomes possible. The divine “I” can appear as a puṃs, a finite knower standing among knowables.

This does not mean that the Lord is truly reduced by something outside himself. It means that the conditions for the appearance of limited subjecthood arise through his own powers of limitation. These powers cause the field to be held in such a way that the Lord may be spoken of as the individual experiencer. That is why they are called dhāraṇās: they hold, sustain, and make possible the structured condition in which finite cognition appears.

So this point deepens the earlier boldness. Limitation is not an alien prison built by another power. It is a causative articulation of Śakti. The same Īśvara who holds all bhāvas in light can, through these powers, appear under the designation puṃs — not because his essence is lost, but because manifestation includes the possibility of finite standpoint.

Only what already shines as held can be called “held” or “illumined”

dhriyamāṇatayā prakāśamānasyaiva hi dhāryamāṇatā prakāśanāsaṃjñā upapadyate yataḥ

“For only what is already appearing as being held can properly have the condition of being held, and the designation ‘illumination.’”

Abhinava now gives the principle behind the causative grammar. Something cannot be made to function as held if it has no basis of appearing at all. Dhāryamāṇatā, the state of being held, and prakāśana-saṃjñā, the designation “illumination,” apply only to what is already prakāśamāna, appearing, shining.

This is subtle but important. The causative does not act upon sheer nothing. It does not produce manifestation from an absolute void. The bhāvas must already be present in the field of light as dhriyamāṇa, being held. Only then can the further causative operation apply: they can be made to stand as differentiated, knowable, experienceable structures.

So Abhinava is protecting the continuity between grammar and ontology. The root meaning of dhṛ, holding, remains. The causative does not erase it. It intensifies or redirects it. What is already held in illumination can be caused to function as held in a more specific way — as the structured world of finite cognition.

A simple example: you cannot “show” something that is absolutely absent. Showing presupposes something capable of appearing. In the same way, rāga and the other powers do not create unrelated objects from nowhere. They work upon bhāvas already shining in Parameśvara’s light, causing them to be held as the differentiated field of knower and known.

This keeps the whole doctrine exact. Limitation is causative, but not independent. Differentiation is real as manifestation, but not separate from prakāśa. The powers of limitation operate only because the bhāvas are already held in the luminous Self.

Śivadṛṣṭyālocana support: command presupposes capacity

yathoktaṃ mayaiva śivadṛṣṭyālocane

preṣo'pi sa bhavedyasya śaktatā nāma vidyate |

iti |

“As I myself have said in the Śivadṛṣṭyālocana:

‘Even command applies only to one in whom there exists a capacity.’”

Abhinava now supports the grammatical-doctrinal point with his own Śivadṛṣṭyālocana. The principle is simple: a command, impulse, or causative prompting can apply only where there is already śaktatā, capacity.

This matters because rāga and the other powers are said to become causative toward Īśvara. But that does not mean they impose something utterly foreign on him. A command cannot make a stone understand Sanskrit. A command cannot make fire become cold. A command works only where the capacity for that action already exists.

So when rāga, vidyā, kalā, and māyā function as causative powers, they do not create limitation out of nothing and force it upon a helpless Lord. They activate a capacity already present in Īśvara’s own freedom: the capacity to appear as differentiated knower and known.

This protects the whole doctrine. If the causative force acted on something without capacity, manifestation would become arbitrary. But Abhinava does not allow that. The finite condition arises because Śakti already contains the power for such manifestation. Limitation is possible because the unlimited is not sterile. It can assume limited form without ceasing to be itself.

Bhartṛhari support: the causative applies when there is already activity

bhartṛharirapi

apravṛttasya hi praiṣe pracchāderlodvidhīyate |
pravṛttasya yadā praiṣastadā sa viṣayo ṇicaḥ ||

iti |

“And Bhartṛhari also says:

‘When one who has not yet begun is commanded, forms such as the imperative are prescribed; but when one already engaged is commanded, then that is the domain of the causative.’”

Abhinava now brings in Bhartṛhari to seal the grammatical point. The distinction is precise. If someone has not yet begun an action — apravṛtta — then one uses a command-form: “do this.” But if someone is already active — pravṛtta — and is then prompted, directed, or caused in a further way, that belongs to the domain of ṇic, the causative.

This matters because Abhinava is explaining why rāga and the other powers can be called dhāraṇās through the causative structure. The causative does not apply to a total absence of activity. It applies where something is already capable, already in motion, already shining in some way. This supports the previous point: command or causation presupposes capacity.

So the bhāvas are not produced from nothing. They are already appearing in Parameśvara’s light, already prakāśamāna, already being held. Then rāga, vidyā, kalā, māyā, and the related powers causatively shape that holding into the finite field of differentiated knower and known.

So thus the grammar is not an external scholastic digression. It confirms the metaphysical structure. The powers of limitation do not act on dead nothing; they act within the living field of illumination. They do not create a second reality outside Īśvara; they cause his own self-manifesting power to appear as finite cognition. The causative works because the capacity is already there.

So the final point is exact: limitation is not alien to consciousness, and causation is not arbitrary. Īśvara already has the power to manifest. Rāga and the others function as the causative articulation of that power, making possible the held, knowable, differentiated world of finite experience.