Parātrīṃśikā Vivaraṇa (Part 94): Beyond Bondage, Not Yet Fully Free

Hands bound by rope that is nearly torn apart against an open sky, symbolizing a state beyond gross bondage yet not fully free — the subtle incompletion of the vijñānakevala.

The previous part explained why Mahāmāyā is needed: it provides the exact place for the vijñānakevalas, beings above ordinary Māyā yet below Śuddhavidyā. They are pure in consciousness but still lack full divine agency, being joined to āṇava mala alone. Through the grace of Śuddhavidyā and the awakening brought about by Ananteśa, they can rise into mantra-status.

Now about the current flow, this is one of those passages where Abhinava’s precision can initially feel almost inhuman. He is classifying Mahāmāyā, Vidyā, Māyā, vijñānakevalas, pralayakevalas, mantra-status, and the higher tattvas with surgical exactness. At first glance it may look like remote metaphysical taxonomy: which being belongs above which tattva, which impurity remains, which śāstra places Mahāmāyā near Vidyā and which places it near Māyā. But underneath this technicality there is a very practical warning: not every elevated spiritual state is final.

The vijñānakevala is the key. This is a being who is no longer sunk in ordinary Māyā. The full impurity of differentiated objecthood has not arisen; gross worldliness is absent; consciousness has become refined and relatively pure. But one impurity remains: āṇava mala, the root contraction of finitude. Such a being may be pure in awareness, yet still lack uttama-kartṛtā, supreme agency. There is luminosity, but not full sovereignty. There is consciousness, but not complete Śiva-consciousness.

This is where the passage becomes relevant to actual sādhana. A practitioner can touch spacious awareness, silence, objectless absorption, or a state beyond ordinary desire and still mistake that for completion. One may no longer be fascinated by the gross world and yet still not have awakened the fullness of svātantrya, the free power of consciousness. Ramana Maharshi made a similar practical distinction when he warned that temporary absorption, however subtle, is not the same as sahaja, the natural and stable realization. In Abhinava’s language, pure awareness without full divine agency remains incomplete.

This is why Mahāmāyā is needed. It names the subtle middle field: above ordinary Māyā, below Śuddhavidyā. From one angle, it can be treated as close to Vidyā, because the impurity of difference is absent. From another angle, it can be treated as the tail-end of Māyā, because root ignorance remains. Abhinava is showing why different śāstras classify it differently. They are not simply confused; they are emphasizing different aspects of an intermediate state — what has been transcended, or what still remains.

So the use of this chunk is real. It teaches discrimination in spiritual life. Do not mistake silence for completion. Do not mistake purity for freedom. Do not mistake withdrawal from objects for sovereignty. A state can be very high and still lack the full flowering of Śakti. The vijñānakevala must be awakened further, by the grace of Śuddhavidyā, into mantra-status and divine function. Abhinava’s map is dense because the path itself is subtle: the higher one rises, the easier it becomes to confuse refined incompleteness with the final truth.

The vijñānakevalas are awakened into mantra-status

bhavanti iti tatraivoktaṃ

vijñānakevalānaṣṭau bodhayāmāsa pudgalān |

ityādinā

“And there too it is said, beginning with:

‘He awakened the eight vijñānakevala persons…’”

Abhinava now continues the support for the previous point. The vijñānakevalas, though pure in consciousness, remain incomplete because they lack supreme agency. But their condition is not final. The cited text says that eight vijñānakevala beings were awakened — bodhayāmāsa.

This confirms the movement from static classification to transformation. The vijñānakevala is not merely a category to be placed on a cosmic chart. It is a condition capable of awakening. Their purity is not enough by itself; they must be awakened into a higher divine function.

The word pudgalān is also significant. These are still individual beings, not the supreme state itself. They are subtle, purified, and elevated, but they remain particular centers needing awakening. Their individuality has not yet opened into full divine agency.

So this point preserves the practical force of the previous chunk. The danger is mistaking refined awareness for completion. Abhinava now shows the upward movement: such beings are awakened by higher grace into the mantra-order. The map is not just descriptive. It is soteriological: it shows how an incomplete state can be carried further.

They are appointed into Mantramaheśvara and Īśa states

mantramaheśvareśatve saṃniyojya |

ityādinā ca |

“And also by the passage beginning, ‘having appointed them into the states of Mantramaheśvara and Īśa.’”

Abhinava now adds another supporting phrase to show what happens to the awakened vijñānakevalas. They are not merely awakened into a vague purity. They are saṃniyojya — appointed, installed, assigned into specific divine functions: Mantramaheśvara and Īśa states.

The broader context from the Mālinīvijayottara Tantra makes this clearer. The text speaks of awakening vijñānakevala beings and then appointing them into mantraic lordship: mantra, mantreśvara, mantramaheśvara, and īśa-like states. Immediately afterward, it speaks of the creation of vast hosts of mantras and then classifies the types of souls, including vijñānakevala and pralayakevala. So this is not casual language. It belongs to a precise hierarchy of awakened divine function.

This matters because the whole problem of the vijñānakevala was incomplete agency. They are pure in consciousness but lack uttama-kartṛtā, supreme doership. Therefore their awakening must include more than illumination. It must include empowerment. They are not only made aware; they are given function.

Practically, this is a crucial distinction for sādhakas. A person may enter refined silence, spacious awareness, or objectless absorption and think, “This must be the end.” But if that state does not awaken Śakti, clarity, agency, mantra-force, and the ability to function from consciousness rather than merely withdraw into it, then it is incomplete from Abhinava’s perspective. Pure awareness without divine efficacy is still not full Śiva-consciousness.

So the transition is exact: from pure but incomplete consciousness to awakened and appointed divine function. The vijñānakevala is not simply dissolved into stillness. He is awakened into participation in the divine order. Consciousness becomes mantraic, operative, luminous, capable. The limitation was lack of supreme agency; therefore the grace must restore agency.

Some śāstras place Mahāmāyā near Vidyā because Māyīya mala is absent

keṣucittu śāstreṣu sā mahāmāyā bhedamalābhāvopacārāt vidyātattvaśeṣatayaiva nirṇīyate

“But in some śāstras, that Mahāmāyā is determined as belonging to the remainder of Vidyā-tattva, by a secondary usage based on the absence of the impurity of difference.”

Abhinava now explains why different śāstras classify Mahāmāyā differently. In some scriptures, Mahāmāyā is treated as belonging close to Vidyā-tattva, or as a remainder of it — vidyātattva-śeṣatayā. Why? Because there is bheda-mala-abhāva, the absence of the impurity of difference.

Here bheda-mala refers to the impurity connected with differentiated objectivity — the full Māyīya condition in which the world appears as a mass of separate knowables. In the vijñānakevala state, this has not fully arisen. There is no gross field of separate objects standing over against the knower. So from that angle, Mahāmāyā can be placed nearer to Vidyā than to ordinary Māyā.

But Abhinava is careful: this is upacāra, secondary or figurative usage. It is not saying that Mahāmāyā is simply identical with Vidyā in the full sense. It is placed there by emphasis on what is absent: the impurity of difference. Since Māyīya mala is not manifest in the vijñānakevala condition, some śāstras classify its field in relation to Vidyā.

This is very useful spiritually. A refined state can look close to liberation because gross differentiation has fallen away. There may be silence, objectlessness, purity, no crude entanglement in the many. From one angle, such a state appears “high” — and it is high. But Abhinava keeps the classification subtle: the absence of gross difference does not automatically mean full freedom. It only explains why some traditions speak of Mahāmāyā as attached to the Vidyā side

Elsewhere, Mahāmāyā is treated as the tail-end of Māyā because āṇava ignorance remains

kvacit punarajñānamalasadbhāvoparodhāt māyātattvapucchatayā

“Elsewhere, however, because of the obstruction caused by the continued presence of the impurity of ignorance, it is treated as the tail-end of Māyā-tattva.”

Abhinava now gives the other side of the classification. Some śāstras place Mahāmāyā near Vidyā because bheda-mala, the impurity of differentiated objecthood, is absent there. But other texts place it closer to Māyā, as the “tail” or lower extension of Māyā-tattva. Why? Because ajñāna-mala still remains.

This is the key to the whole subtlety. The vijñānakevala is beyond gross differentiated objectivity, but not beyond root ignorance. They may not be bound by full Māyīya mala, but they are still dependent on āṇava mala, the impurity of finitude, the loss of full recognition of one’s own sovereign nature. So from one standpoint, they are close to Vidyā; from another, they are still tied to Māyā.

This is very psychologically and spiritually exact. A refined state may feel luminous, silent, objectless, and almost free. But if the root sense of incompleteness remains — if full svātantrya, divine freedom and agency, has not awakened — then the state still belongs, in some sense, to the side of limitation. It is high, but not final.

So Abhinava is showing why different śāstras classify Mahāmāyā differently. They are not necessarily contradicting each other. One emphasizes what has been transcended: differentiated object-bound impurity. The other emphasizes what remains: root ignorance. Both are true from different angles.

That is a useful warning for sādhana. Do not judge a state only by what is absent. Silence may be present, but is freedom present? Objectivity may be quiet, but is Śakti awakened? Gross bondage may be gone, but has āṇava mala burned? This is why Mahāmāyā can be seen both as near Vidyā and as the tail-end of Māyā.

Rāga is sometimes not treated separately because it is attached to puṃs

yathā keṣucit śāstreṣu rāgatattvaṃ puṃsyeva lagnam iti na pṛthak parāmṛṣṭam

“Just as, in some śāstras, the rāga-tattva is not considered separately, because it is attached to puṃs itself.”

Abhinava now gives an example to justify the different classifications of Mahāmāyā. Some scriptures do not treat rāga-tattva separately, because rāga is regarded as attached to puṃs, the limited subject. In other words, instead of giving rāga an independent place in the list, they fold it into the condition of the finite experiencer.

This helps explain the logic of scriptural variation. A tattva may be distinct in one system and absorbed into another category in a different system, depending on what the text wants to emphasize. If the concern is the structure of limitation in detail, rāga is treated separately as the contraction of fullness into desire and lack. If the concern is the bound subject as a whole, rāga may be treated as inseparable from puṃs, because the limited subject almost always lives through lack: “I need,” “I want,” “I am incomplete without this.”

That is why this example is not random. It mirrors the case of Mahāmāyā. Some śāstras place Mahāmāyā near Vidyā because the impurity of difference is absent. Others place it near Māyā because root ignorance remains. Likewise, some texts isolate rāga as its own tattva, while others attach it to puṃs. The classification shifts according to standpoint.

So Abhinava is teaching flexibility without vagueness. The categories are not arbitrary, but their presentation can vary. A precise interpreter must ask: from what angle is this śāstra speaking? What function is being emphasized? Is the text distinguishing a tattva separately, or folding it into a neighboring condition because of practical closeness?

Here the practical meaning is clear: desire is not merely one emotion among others. It is structurally tied to finite subjectivity. To be puṃs, the limited experiencer, is already to be haunted by incompleteness. That is why rāga can sometimes be treated as inseparable from him.

In some Trika scriptures, niyati and kāla are not separately explained

yathā vā ihaiva śrītrikāgameṣu niyatikālau na pṛthak nirūpitau

“Or just as, even here in the revered Trika scriptures, niyati and kāla are not explained separately.”

Abhinava now gives a second example of flexible classification. Just as rāga may sometimes be treated as attached to puṃs and therefore not separately discussed, so too in some Trika scriptures niyati and kāla are not separately explained.

This does not mean that niyati and kāla are unimportant. Niyati is the power of order, necessity, placement, and constraint: this thing happens here, under these conditions, in this relation, not otherwise. Kāla is temporal limitation: sequence, before and after, duration, aging, the experience that things unfold in time rather than all at once in free fullness. These are central structures of finite experience.

But a śāstra may choose not to isolate them separately if its present aim does not require that level of differentiation. It may fold them into a broader limiting structure, just as some texts fold rāga into puṃs or place Mahāmāyā differently depending on whether they emphasize what is absent or what remains.

So Abhinava is teaching a very important hermeneutic principle: absence of separate mention does not always mean denial. Sometimes a tattva is not separately described because it is included under another category for that scripture’s purpose. A mature interpreter must know when a distinction is being denied and when it is simply being absorbed into a different explanatory scheme.

This is directly relevant to the present issue of Mahāmāyā. Some systems classify it near Vidyā, others near Māyā. That does not automatically mean confusion. It may mean different angles of emphasis. The śāstric map is precise, but not always presented with the same granularity.

In this view, the five Brahma-tattvas run from Vidyā up to Anāśrita-Śiva

atra mate vidyādyanāśritaśivāntaṃ brahmapañcakaṃ nirṇeṣyate ca etat

“In the present view, the fivefold group of Brahma-tattvas, beginning with Vidyā and ending with Anāśrita-Śiva, will be determined.”

Abhinava now states the position of the present system. After showing that different śāstras classify Mahāmāyā differently — sometimes near Vidyā, sometimes near Māyā, sometimes folding certain tattvas into adjacent categories — he now says: in this view, the Brahma-pañcaka, the fivefold group of Brahma-tattvas, extends from Vidyā up to Anāśrita-Śiva.

This is important because Abhinava is not merely listing another opinion among opinions. He has just taught us how to understand śāstric variation without panic. Now he marks the exact standpoint of the present exposition. Here, the five higher tattvas are to be understood in this particular range: beginning with Vidyā and culminating in Anāśrita-Śiva, the unconditioned or unsupported Śiva-principle beyond dependence on lower supports.

The phrase nirṇeṣyate matters — “it will be determined.” The text is not casually mentioning these levels. Their meaning will be fixed within the logic of this Tantra’s alphabetic unfolding. This continues the whole method: first acknowledge variation, then identify the operative standpoint, then determine the meaning according to the present scripture.

So the point functions as a reset after the discussion of alternate classifications. Abhinava is saying: yes, śāstras may arrange these tattvas differently depending on their purpose. But here, in this system, the higher group is to be read as the Brahma-pañcaka from Vidyā to Anāśrita-Śiva. The map is flexible across scriptures, but exact within each scripture.

These tattvas are “great” because they transcend difference and generate saṃsāra

eṣāṃ ca tattvānāṃ bṛhattvaṃ bṛṃhakatvaṃ ca prāyo bhedasamuttīrṇatvāt saṃsārasūtikartṛtvāt ca

“And these tattvas possess greatness and expansiveness because they mostly transcend difference, and because they generate the birth of saṃsāra.”

Abhinava now explains why this higher group is called Brahma-pañcaka. The word is connected with bṛhattva, greatness or vastness, and bṛṃhakatva, expansiveness, the power to make grow or expand. These tattvas are not small operative categories like the lower instruments of cognition and action. They belong to a vast level of manifestation.

The first reason is prāyo bheda-samuttīrṇatvāt — they have, for the most part, gone beyond difference. This is important. These levels are not submerged in the ordinary differentiated field where subject and object stand apart in the dense way. They are closer to divine unity. Difference is not absent in every sense, but it has been largely transcended.

The second reason is saṃsāra-sūti-kartṛtvāt — they generate the birth of saṃsāra. This is the paradox. These tattvas are great not only because they transcend difference, but also because they are causally powerful. From their level, the whole process of finite experience can be generated. They are vast enough to stand near the divine, and potent enough to give rise to the field of bondage.

So Brahma here should not be heard as merely “holy” or “high.” It carries the sense of vast generative power. These tattvas are large because they are close to the source and because they can expand into worlds. They are not merely passive stations in a hierarchy. They are womb-like powers from which the drama of saṃsāra can unfold.

This continues the practical warning from the vijñānakevala discussion. Subtle and elevated does not automatically mean final. A level may mostly transcend difference and still be connected with the generation of finite experience. In Abhinava’s map, greatness does not mean harmless abstraction. The higher tattvas are powerful because they stand near unity and yet can seed manifestation.

The thirty-four tattvas take akāra as their initial form

evametāni catustriṃśattattvāni prakriyātmanā sthitāni akārameva ādirūpatayā bhajante

“Thus these thirty-four tattvas, standing in the form of a process, take akāra itself as their initial form.”

Abhinava now closes this movement by gathering the whole mapping into akāra. The tattvas have been unfolded in sequence — from the lower fields of gross manifestation, through the organs and inner instruments, through the kañcukas, and now through the subtle higher region involving Mahāmāyā, vijñānakevalas, Śuddhavidyā, mantra-status, and the higher divine levels. All of this is not a random pile of categories. It stands prakriyātmanā — as a process, as an ordered unfolding.

The number given here is catustriṃśat, thirty-four. This reflects the specific tattva-structure being used in this context, not merely the more familiar thirty-six-tattva scheme in its standard form. Abhinava is working within the logic of this Tantra’s alphabetic and process-oriented mapping. The point is not to force every śāstric list into one rigid template, but to see how this particular prakriyā unfolds.

And this whole process takes akāra as its ādi-rūpa, its initial form. This returns us to the opening of the verse — athādyāḥ — and to the doctrine of the vowels beginning with a. Akāra is not merely the first letter in a schoolbook sense. It is the opening vibration, the first articulated form of the whole process. Everything that follows is already seeded in that beginning.

So the chunk closes cleanly here. Abhinava has shown why Mahāmāyā must be accepted, how the vijñānakevalas occupy the subtle region above Māyā and below Śuddhavidyā, how they can awaken into mantra-status, and how different śāstras classify these tattvas from different standpoints. Now he gathers the entire process: these thirty-four tattvas stand as an ordered unfolding beginning from akāra.

This is a good place to stop because the next sentence opens a new question: what kind of sequence is this? Is it creation, dissolution, cognition, stability, or descent? That is no longer merely the completion of this mapping; it is a fresh hermeneutic inquiry into the order itself.