Parātrīṃśikā Vivaraṇa (Part 81): Variegated Cognition and the Unity of Appearance

the image itself is visibly variegated: the murti, serpent, trident, rudrākṣa, cloth, colors, textures, background. Many distinct elements appear, yet the image is grasped as one whole form. That matches the chunk’s center almost exactly: variety does not require fragmentation of cognition.

The previous chunk explained how ordinary cognition becomes contracted through the subtle sequence of tuṭis. Even the simple act of grasping “blue” was shown to contain a whole inner unfolding: non-division, emergence of the grasper, nirvikalpa, vikalpa, clarified subjectivity, and entry into the grasped. From there the text showed how reduction of vikalpa leads toward Śivāveśa, and how tuṭipāta opens the non-artificial ground of omniscience.

Now Abhinava turns to the epistemic foundation of that analysis. If nirvikalpa cognition precedes determinate cognition, what exactly is its status? Is it vague? Is it invalid? Does it contain contradiction because later distinct appearances — blue, yellow, and so on — seem mutually opposed? Or is it a deeper, self-luminous cognition in which those later distinctions are already present without being divided?

This chunk answers that. Abhinava says that even though the reality under discussion is self-luminous, it can still be shown by reasoning. He then uses the analogy of citra-jñāna, the cognition of a variegated form, to show how plurality can be present in one cognition without breaking that cognition into pieces. This continues the previous argument exactly: contracted cognition divides, sequences, and determines; but prior to that division, there is a non-conceptual cognition that is not empty. It is one, luminous, and capable of containing what later appears as differentiated and even opposed.

Short gist of the chunk is that before the mind divides experience into “blue,” “yellow,” “this,” and “that,” there is one non-conceptual cognition. It is not empty or confused. Like seeing one variegated image, it holds many appearances without being split into pieces. Later vikalpa divides what was first given as one luminous whole.

The self-luminous reality is shown through reasoning

evameṣa svaprakāśaikarūpo'pi artho yuktyā pradarśyate

“Thus, this reality, though having the single nature of self-luminosity, is nevertheless shown through reasoning.”

Abhinava begins carefully. The reality under discussion is svaprakāśaika-rūpa — its one nature is self-luminosity. It does not need another light in order to be known. It is not an inert object waiting to be revealed by something else. It shines by itself.

But he immediately adds: yuktyā pradarśyate — it is shown through reasoning. This is important. Since it is self-luminous, reasoning does not produce it, prove it from outside, or make it real. Reasoning has a different function here. It removes confusion, shows coherence, and prevents the intellect from falling into wrong alternatives.

This is very much in continuity with the previous chunk. There too, the ground of omniscience was akṛtrima, non-artificial. Practice did not manufacture it; practice removed contraction. Here, similarly, reasoning does not manufacture self-luminous reality. It displays it in a way that makes the structure intelligible and guards it from misunderstanding.

So Abhinava is again holding a precise middle. He does not reduce the matter to dry logic, as though self-luminous consciousness were an inferred object. But he also does not despise reasoning. Yukti has a real role: it sharpens vision, cuts false objections, and makes clear how the one luminous cognition can contain plurality without contradiction.

What follows is not a mere argument about perception. It is reasoning in service of direct luminosity. The thing shown is self-shining; the reasoning does not light it up, but clears the smoke around it.

The general thesis: nirvikalpa cognition has valid correspondence

yat yat svasāmarthyodbhūtottarakālikārthakriyāyogyatādivaśaniḥśeṣyamāṇasatyatāvaśāvāptāvicalasaṃvādaṃ

“Whatever has an unwavering correspondence attained through the force of its truth being fully ascertained by later practical efficacy and similar factors arising from its own capacity…”

Abhinava now begins the reasoning itself. He is describing a cognition whose validity is not fragile or merely theoretical. Its satyatā, its truth, is niḥśeṣyamāṇa — completely ascertained, exhausted of doubt — through what later unfolds from its own capacity.

The key phrase is sva-sāmarthya-udbhūta-uttarakālika-artha-kriyā-yogyatā. The cognition has a capacity of its own, and from that capacity later arises fitness for practical efficacy. In simpler terms: the later ability to function successfully with the object confirms that the earlier appearing was not groundless. If the cognition later supports effective engagement, then its truth is not merely claimed; it is shown.

This is why Abhinava speaks of avicala-saṃvāda, unwavering correspondence. The cognition does not collapse when tested by later unfolding. It remains in agreement with what follows from it. This matters because he is about to speak about nirvikalpa-saṃvid, non-conceptual cognition, and he needs to protect it from being dismissed as vague or useless. Its non-conceptuality does not make it invalid.

So the point is precise: before discussing the apparent contradiction in nirvikalpa cognition, Abhinava first establishes that the cognition under discussion has real validity. It is confirmed by later practical efficacy. It corresponds unwaveringly. It is not a blur pretending to be knowledge.

It appears contradictory because it precedes sequential conceptual cognitions

virodhāvabhāsi saṃmatakramikavikalpyamānanīlādiniṣṭhavikalpapūrvabhāvi nirvikalpasaṃvidrūpaṃ

“Having the form of nirvikalpa cognition, preceding the determinate cognitions established in blue and the like, which are conceptually formed in an accepted sequential order, it appears contradictory.”

Abhinava now states the problem in its simplest form. There is first a non-conceptual cognition — nirvikalpa-saṃvid — and only afterward come the sequential conceptual determinations, the vikalpas, fixed upon things such as nīla, blue, and the rest.

Take a simple example: one looks at a colorful painting. At the first instant, before the mind says “blue here,” “yellow there,” “red there,” there is one immediate visual appearing. Then the mind begins to divide and determine: this is blue, that is yellow, that is red. These later determinations arise in sequence and each has its own boundary.

From the standpoint of these later vikalpas, the appearances can seem mutually exclusive. Blue is not yellow. Yellow is not red. Each concept fixes one thing by excluding another. So if the earlier nirvikalpa cognition somehow precedes all these later determinations, it may seem contradictory: how can one prior cognition be connected with what later becomes divided into opposed conceptual forms?

That is what virodha-avabhāsi means here. The contradiction is not yet being affirmed as real. It only appears so when the earlier undivided cognition is judged from the later standpoint of conceptual division. Abhinava first lets this difficulty stand clearly: the prior cognition is one and non-conceptual, while the later cognitions are sequential, determinate, and fixed upon distinct appearances such as blue. The next phrase will explain why this apparent contradiction does not actually damage the doctrine.

It is undivided from appearances later regarded as mutually opposed

tattadvikalpanīyaviruddhābhimatanīlapītādyābhāsāvibhāgi bhavati yathā

“It is undivided from the appearances of blue, yellow, and so on, which are regarded as mutually opposed when they become objects of their respective vikalpas, as for example…”

Abhinava now explains why the contradiction only appears, and is not real. The prior nirvikalpa-saṃvid is avibhāgi — undivided from the appearances of nīla, pīta, blue, yellow, and so on. These appearances are later treated as viruddha, mutually opposed, when they become objects of their respective vikalpas. But in the prior non-conceptual cognition, they are not yet separated in that way.

The painting example helps again. In the first immediate visual appearing, the colors are not yet cut apart by the mind as “blue here,” “yellow there,” “red there.” The whole field appears at once. Later, vikalpa divides it: this part is blue, that part is yellow. Once that division happens, blue and yellow are treated as mutually exclusive. But the first appearing was not a confused mixture. It was one undivided visual presence from which those later determinations could arise.

So Abhinava’s point is precise: nirvikalpa cognition is not separate from the appearances that later become conceptually opposed, but it is also not itself trapped in their later opposition. It holds them before conceptual exclusion hardens.

That is why the word yathā is important. Abhinava is now about to give an analogy: citra-jñāna, cognition of a variegated form. This analogy will show how many distinct appearances can shine within one cognition without forcing us to divide cognition itself into many pieces.

In variegated cognition, the variegated form cannot be an external inert form

[yathā citrajñāne na tāvaccitraṃ rūpaṃ na bhāsate - saṃvittivirodhāt jaḍasya ca prakāśāyogaḥ

“Just as, in the cognition of a variegated form, the variegated form does not appear as such [as something external and inert], because that would contradict consciousness, and because what is inert cannot shine forth.”

Abhinava now introduces the analogy of citra-jñāna, the cognition of a variegated form. This means a cognition in which many distinct appearances seem to be present together — like seeing a multicolored painting, a patterned cloth, or a landscape containing many colors and shapes at once.

The question is: what is the status of this citra-rūpa, this variegated form? Does it shine as an inert object outside cognition? The gloss says no. If the variegated form were simply jaḍa, inert, then it could not appear by itself. An inert thing does not illuminate itself. It has no power of self-presentation. For it to appear, it must be held in saṃvid, consciousness.

This is why the gloss says saṃvit-virodhāt — because to treat the appearing form as something wholly outside consciousness contradicts the very fact of appearing. If it appears, it is already in relation to luminosity. And since jaḍa cannot possess prakāśa by itself, the variegated form cannot be explained as a dead external thing shining on its own.

This directly supports the previous point. The prior nirvikalpa-saṃvid is undivided from appearances that later become conceptually opposed. The analogy of citra-jñāna shows how that can be so: many colors or forms may appear, but their appearing is not explained by positing a separate inert object outside consciousness. Their appearing belongs to cognition itself. The many are not outside the luminous field in which they are seen.

Therefore the variegated form is cognition-nature

tenedaṃ jñānātmakameva rūpaṃ

“Therefore, this form is nothing but cognition-nature.”

The gloss now states the conclusion from the previous reasoning. Since the variegated form cannot be a dead external object shining on its own, it must be jñānātmaka — of the nature of cognition itself.

This is a compact but decisive statement. The citra-rūpa, the variegated form, is not first an inert thing outside and then secondarily known by cognition. Its appearing is already cognition-formed. To appear is not something added to it from outside; its appearing belongs to the luminous field of jñāna.

This does not mean that the many colors or forms are simply invented in a shallow subjective sense. Abhinava is not reducing the world to private fantasy. The point is subtler: whatever appears, appears only as inseparable from cognition. The form’s luminous presence is not outside consciousness. Therefore, when many appearances show themselves together, their unity is not explained by an external object somehow shining by itself, but by the one cognition in which they appear.

A modern analogy may help, if kept within limits. Even contemporary perception science does not treat color as a self-shining property simply sitting outside us; color-experience arises through the organism’s visual and neural processing. But Abhinava’s claim is stronger. He is not merely saying that the brain processes an external object. He is saying that the appearing form, as appearing, is inseparable from jñāna itself.

This prepares the next argument. If the variegated form is jñānātmaka, then the mere fact that different colors or aspects appear does not automatically mean there are many separate cognitions. The form may be varied in appearance, yet the cognition can remain one.

Difference of appearance does not imply difference of cognition

na ca ākārabhedena jñānabhedaḥ - citrarūpasyaikasya ākārabhedābhāvāt

“And difference of form does not imply difference of cognition, because the one variegated form has no difference of form within itself.”

The gloss now blocks a possible objection. Someone may say: if different forms appear — blue, yellow, red, bright, dark, curved, straight — then there must be different cognitions corresponding to each of them. Difference in ākāra, form or appearance, would imply difference in jñāna, cognition.

But the gloss says no: ākāra-bheda does not necessarily entail jñāna-bheda. The mere fact that a cognition contains differentiated appearance does not mean the cognition itself is broken into many separate cognitions.

The reason is citra-rūpasya ekasya ākāra-bheda-abhāvāt — the variegated form, precisely as one variegated form, does not have a further internal difference of form in the relevant sense. A painting may contain blue, yellow, and red, but “the variegated painting” is still grasped as one variegated whole. The variety does not destroy the unity of the appearing form.

This is exactly what Abhinava needs for the larger argument. The prior nirvikalpa-saṃvid can be undivided from many later-differentiated appearances without becoming many separate cognitions. Multiplicity of appearance does not automatically fracture the luminous field in which it appears.

So the point is not that differences are unreal in a cheap sense. The colors do appear as different. The forms do appear as different. But the cognition of the variegated whole is not divided merely because its content is variegated. The one cognition is rich enough to contain difference without itself being shattered by difference.

Just as blue has one blue-form, variegation has one variegated-form

yathā nīlasyaiko nīlasvabhāva ākāraḥ tathā vaicitryasyaikasya citrasvabhāva evākāraḥ

“Just as blue has one form whose nature is blue, so the one variegation has one form whose very nature is variegated.”

The gloss now clarifies the previous point with a simple analogy. Nīla, blue, has one ākāra, one form, whose nature is blue. When blue appears, we do not divide the blue-form into many separate cognitions merely because it has intensity, spread, or visual presence. It appears as one blue-form.

In the same way, vaicitrya, variegation, has one citra-svabhāva ākāra — one form whose nature is variegated. This is the key. Variegation does not mean a heap of separate cognitions pasted together. It means one appearing form whose nature is precisely to be manifold.

A simple example: when seeing a colorful painting, the painting appears as varied. Blue, yellow, red, shadow, and contour are all there. But the cognition is not necessarily chopped into separate isolated acts: first blue-cognition, then yellow-cognition, then red-cognition, as though the whole could never appear. The variegated form itself appears as one variegated whole.

This strengthens Abhinava’s defense of nirvikalpa-saṃvid. The prior non-conceptual cognition may be undivided from many appearances that later become conceptually separated. That does not make it contradictory. Just as blue has one blue-form, the variegated has one variegated-form. Unity here does not mean absence of diversity. It means that diversity itself can appear as one form.

Cognition operates in the whole variegated form, not in part

tasmiṃścātmabhūte jñānaṃ pravartamānaṃ kṛtsna eva pravartate yadi vā na pravartata eva na tu bhāgena pravartate tasya nirbhāgatvāt

“And when cognition operates in that form which has become its own self, it operates in the whole of it; or else it does not operate at all. It does not operate in part, because that form is without parts.”

The gloss now draws the consequence with real precision. The citra-rūpa, the variegated form, has been shown to be jñānātmaka, cognition-nature. It is not an inert object outside cognition. Now the gloss says that when jñāna operates in that form as ātmabhūta — as something that has become its own self — it operates in the whole, kṛtsna eva. Or, if it does not operate, it does not operate at all. What it cannot do is operate only in a part.

Why? Because that form is nirbhāga, without parts.

This is subtle. The painting may seem to contain parts: blue here, yellow there, red there. But the actual citra-rūpa, the variegated appearing as one cognition-form, is not a heap of separate fragments. As one appearing, it is partless in the relevant sense. Therefore cognition cannot grasp “one part” of that single variegated form while leaving the rest of that very form untouched. It either takes the variegated appearing as a whole, or it does not take it.

This is exactly what Abhinava needs for the larger argument about nirvikalpa-saṃvid. The prior non-conceptual cognition is undivided from appearances that later become distinguished as blue, yellow, and so on. But this does not mean that cognition is split into pieces. The many later distinctions arise from within a prior whole. The one cognition is not broken merely because its appearing is rich.

So the point is severe but elegant: variety does not require fragmentation of cognition. The form can be variegated, and yet the cognition of that form can be whole. This is how Abhinava protects both sides at once — real differentiation in appearance, and real unity in the luminous cognition that bears it.

The mutually distinct parts are not the true variegated form

ye tvamī bhāgāḥ parasparaviviktāḥ pratibhānti na te citraṃ rūpamiti bhāvaḥ |]

“But those parts which appear as mutually distinct — they are not the variegated form itself. This is the sense.”

The gloss now closes the analogy by making the distinction explicit. The separate parts that appear — bhāgāḥ paraspara-viviktāḥ, parts mutually distinguished from one another — are not the true citra-rūpa itself. They are how the variegated form comes to appear when divided into parts, but they are not the single variegated form as such.

This is the decisive clarification. When we look at a multicolored painting, we may later distinguish blue here, yellow there, red elsewhere. Those distinctions appear, and they are not simply denied. But the citra-rūpa, the variegated form, is not identical with a pile of mutually isolated parts. The variegated form is the one whole in which those parts can appear as distinguished.

This completes the analogy for nirvikalpa-saṃvid. The non-conceptual cognition is undivided from appearances later treated as opposed — blue, yellow, and so on. But that does not make it contradictory, because the original appearing is not a collection of separate conceptual fragments. It is one cognition-form, one luminous whole, from which later vikalpas draw distinctions.

So the gloss has now answered the objection. The apparent contradiction arose only because later conceptual divisions were projected back onto the prior cognition. But just as a variegated form is one variegated whole before being analyzed into mutually distinct parts, nirvikalpa-saṃvid can be undivided from many appearances without becoming divided or incoherent. Its unity is not emptiness; it is a whole capable of bearing variety.