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| This image shows awareness before ordinary mental articulation. There is no face, no personal psychology, no “thinker” as an egoic character. Instead, the head is replaced by a vast luminous field. aham-pratyavamarśa is not the small ego saying “I am this person.” It is the primordial self-apprehension of consciousness before it divides into “I know this object.” |
Previous part ended by showing that the interval between two conceptual cognitions cannot be denied. If it were denied, cognition would become a chain of disconnected flashes, and smaraṇa, anusaṃdhāna, and ordinary vyavahāra would collapse. A past cognition must remain inwardly as consciousness-trace, otherwise memory and recognition would be impossible.
Now Abhinava presses this conclusion into a more fundamental doctrine. The interval is not merely a psychological gap. It is tied to pratibhā, the flash of consciousness that all schools, in some form, are forced to accept because no cognition, memory, or view could function without it. But then a new difficulty arises: if this pratibhā includes parāmarśa, self-apprehension or reflexive awareness, does that make it vikalpa? Abhinava’s answer is exact: no. Reflexive awareness belongs essentially to consciousness; without it, consciousness would become like inert crystal. But vikalpa requires the flashing forth of difference and dual determination. Pure parāmarśa is not that.
So this chunk shifts from continuity of cognition to the deeper nature of consciousness itself: consciousness is not mere passive light. It is luminous self-apprehension. Yet this self-apprehension is not conceptual construction.
All schools accept the substrate called pratibhā
pratibhākhyasya dharmiṇaḥ sarvavādinaḥ prati avivāda eva iti na asiddhiḥ
“Since there is no dispute among any of the schools regarding the bearer called pratibhā, there is no failure of establishment.”
Abhinava now begins the new movement from the ground established in the previous chunk. The nirvikalpaka interval could not be denied, because without it smaraṇa, memory, and anusaṃdhāna, continuity of cognition, would collapse. Now he names the underlying bearer of that continuity: pratibhā.
The phrase sarvavādinaḥ prati avivādaḥ must be read carefully. Abhinava is not saying that all schools openly accept pratibhā in the full Trika sense. They do not. A Buddhist, a Naiyāyika, a Mīmāṃsaka, a Vedāntin, a Sāṃkhya thinker — each would explain cognition, memory, and continuity differently. But Abhinava’s point is sharper: whatever name they use, they cannot avoid accepting some principle that allows cognition to hold together across moments.
For example, Buddhist schools that insist on momentariness still need saṃskāra, causal traces, and in Yogācāra especially something like ālaya-vijñāna, a storehouse-consciousness structure, to explain continuity of experience and karmic seed. They may reject a permanent self, but they cannot make experience into unrelated flashes with no trace. Hindu schools likewise speak in their own languages: saṃskāra, vāsanā, smṛti, ātman, buddhi, or other principles that allow recognition, memory, and the carrying-forward of cognition. The metaphysical interpretations differ, but the functional necessity remains.
That is the force of na asiddhiḥ — there is no failure of establishment. Pratibhā is not an arbitrary mystical invention. At the level of lived cognition, something like it is unavoidable. If memory occurs, if recognition occurs, if one cognition can connect to another, then the argument already has a foothold.
So Abhinava’s move is disciplined. He is not yet demanding that every school accept his full doctrine of saṃvid. He is saying: first admit what no one can seriously avoid — cognition has continuity, and that continuity requires a bearer. Trika will call that bearer pratibhā and understand it as consciousness-flash, but the necessity itself is common ground.
The Sūtravimarśinī verse praises Śiva as the unsetting consciousness
uktaṃ hi sūtravimarśinyāmanenaiva
vinā yena na kiṃcitsyātsamastā api dṛṣṭayaḥ |
anastamitasaṃbodhasvarūpaṃ taṃ stumaḥ śivam ||
“For it has been said in the Sūtravimarśinī:
‘Without whom nothing at all could exist, not even all the systems of vision — him, Śiva, whose nature is unsetting consciousness, we praise.’”
Abhinava now supports the previous claim with a verse. He had just said that the bearer called pratibhā is not unestablished, because every school must implicitly accept some principle that makes cognition, memory, and continuity possible. Now the verse gives that principle its Śaiva name: Śiva, whose nature is anastamita-saṃbodha — consciousness that never sets.
The phrase vinā yena na kiṃcit syāt is absolute: without this, nothing whatsoever could be. And Abhinava immediately includes samastā api dṛṣṭayaḥ — even all philosophical views, all systems of seeing, all doctrinal positions. This is sharp. The disputing schools may argue against one another, and may reject the Śaiva formulation, but the very possibility of their view appearing, being known, remembered, defended, and connected across arguments depends on the same unsetting consciousness.
So the verse is not merely devotional ornament. It reinforces the argument. Every dṛṣṭi, every philosophical standpoint, needs a luminous ground in order to appear at all. A Buddhist theory, a Nyāya theory, a Vedānta theory, a Sāṃkhya theory — all of them are intelligible only because consciousness does not vanish between cognitions. Even disagreement presupposes this deeper continuity.
That is why Śiva is called anastamita-saṃbodha-svarūpa. Ordinary cognitions rise and set. One thought fades, another arises. One perception gives way to another. But the consciousness by which these risings and settings are known does not itself set in the same way. It remains the condition for every appearing, every memory, every doctrine, every denial.
This completes the force of sarvavādinaḥ prati avivādaḥ. The schools may dispute the metaphysical interpretation, but they cannot function without the unsetting luminosity that makes their dispute possible. Abhinava names that reality as Śiva.
Because it does not depend on conventional learning, it is avikalpa
saṃketavyutpattikālānavalambanāt ca asya avikalpatvameva
“And because it does not depend on the time of learning convention, its nature is certainly avikalpa.”
Abhinava now clarifies why this pratibhā cannot be treated as ordinary conceptual cognition. Vikalpa depends on convention. To recognize something conceptually as “blue,” “cow,” “pot,” “self,” “world,” or “God,” there must be some learned relation between sign, meaning, distinction, and usage. That is saṃketa-vyutpatti — the acquisition of convention.
But pratibhā does not wait for that. It does not arise only after one has learned linguistic or conceptual conventions. It is prior to that whole structure. It is the flash by which anything can appear at all, before the mind places the appearance into a learned grid of names and determinations.
This is why Abhinava says asya avikalpatvam eva — it is indeed non-conceptual. Not because it is dull or blank, but because it is not dependent on convention-learning. A child, an animal, or even a person before verbal judgment still has appearing. There is luminosity before naming. There is experience before classification.
So the movement is exact. First, Abhinava establishes pratibhā as unavoidable because memory, recognition, and continuity require it. Then he supports this through the verse on anastamita-saṃbodha, the unsetting consciousness without which no view could arise. Now he distinguishes it from vikalpa: it is not conceptual construction, because it does not depend on learned convention. It is the pre-conceptual flash that makes convention possible in the first place.
Innate non-conventional self-apprehension belongs necessarily to consciousness
sahajāsāmayikatathāparāmarśayogo hi jaḍavilakṣaṇasaṃvidrūpanāntarīyakaḥ
“For the presence of such innate, non-conventional parāmarśa is inseparable from the nature of consciousness, which is distinct from the inert.”
Abhinava now explains why pratibhā is avikalpa without becoming inert or empty. It has parāmarśa, self-apprehension, but that parāmarśa is sahaja and asāmayika — innate and non-conventional. It does not arise from learned signs, social agreement, or linguistic training. It belongs to consciousness by nature.
This is the important distinction. Vikalpa is conceptual determination based on difference, convention, and learned articulation. But parāmarśa in its primary sense is not that. It is consciousness’s own reflexive self-touch, the fact that awareness does not merely illuminate something but also implicitly knows itself in illuminating.
In simple words, Parāmarśa means: awareness is not just shining; it also “knows that it shines.”. Not as a sentence. Not as thought. Not as “I am aware” verbally. More like silent self-presence. When there is pain, you do not need a second thought saying, “I know pain.” Pain is immediately felt. But even more: the feeling is self-revealing. It is not hidden from itself. That self-felt quality of experience is close to parāmarśa.
Abhinava’s reason is direct: this is jaḍa-vilakṣaṇa-saṃvid-rūpa-nāntarīyaka — inseparable from consciousness precisely because consciousness is unlike the inert. A stone may be present, but it does not know that it is present. A crystal may reflect light, but it does not inwardly apprehend its own shining. Consciousness is different because its luminosity is not blind. It carries self-apprehension within itself.
So Abhinava is preventing a serious mistake. If we say pratibhā is non-conceptual, we must not reduce it to a mute blank. It is non-conceptual, yes, but it is alive with innate parāmarśa. And if we say it has parāmarśa, we must not reduce that to vikalpa. Its self-apprehension is not learned, not constructed, not dependent on convention. It is what makes consciousness consciousness rather than inert luminosity.
A simple example may help. You open your eyes and see a blue cup. Before the mind says “this is a blue cup,” there is a first flash of appearing. That flash is pratibhā. It is not yet conceptual, because you have not yet applied the learned convention “blue” or “cup”; therefore it is avikalpa. But it is not blank or inert. The appearing is inwardly self-present — consciousness does not merely light the cup like a lamp lighting a wall; it also implicitly knows its own shining. That living self-touch is parāmarśa. Because this self-touch is not learned from language or convention, it is sahaja and asāmayika — innate and non-conventional. Only afterward does vikalpa arise and say, “this is a blue cup.” So the sequence is: first pratibhā, the non-conceptual flash; within it, parāmarśa, the self-apprehending nature of awareness; then later vikalpa, the conceptual determination shaped by learned convention.
Vimarśa is the very nature of manifestation
uktaṃ ca
svabhāvamavabhāsasya vimarśaṃ viduranyathā |
prakāśo'rthoparakto'pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ ||
“And it has been said:
‘They know vimarśa to be the very nature of manifestation. Otherwise, even though prakāśa were colored by objects, it would be like inert crystal and the like.’”
The supporting verse now gives the decisive answer to the objection. If consciousness were only prakāśa, mere illumination, without vimarśa, reflexive awareness, it would not be living consciousness. It would be like sphaṭika, crystal: capable of reflecting colors, but inert.
This is the heart of the distinction. A crystal can appear red when a red flower is placed near it, or blue when something blue is nearby. But the crystal does not know the red. It does not know itself as reflecting. It is bright in a passive sense, but not conscious. If consciousness were only a neutral light taking on object-forms, it would fall into the same problem: it would illuminate, but without inward self-presence.
That is why the verse says vimarśaṃ svabhāvam avabhāsasya viduḥ — vimarśa is known to be the very nature of manifestation. Manifestation is not merely something appearing; it is appearing that is self-present. The appearing does not lie there dumbly. It shines with inward awareness of its own shining.
This helps clarify parāmarśa too. Vimarśa and parāmarśa are closely related here: both point to the reflexive, self-apprehending nature of consciousness. Without this, prakāśa would become a dead light. With it, consciousness is not like a camera, mirror, or crystal. It does not merely register forms. It knows.
Here vimarśa names the general reflexive nature of consciousness, while parāmarśa names that same reflexivity as a concrete self-apprehending touch. The verse supports Abhinava’s claim that parāmarśa does not make consciousness conceptual; it simply prevents consciousness from becoming inert like crystal.
Simplest analogy:
prakāśa = light.
vimarśa = the light is alive, not inert.
parāmarśa = the living light inwardly touches/knows itself.
So the verse protects Abhinava’s position from both sides. Consciousness is not conceptual vikalpa, because no duality has yet flashed forth. But it is also not inert non-conceptual blankness. It is living luminosity, and the life of that luminosity is vimarśa.
Further objection: why is this not vikalpa?
na ca vācyaṃ kathaṃ tathāpi tadvikalparūpaṃ na syāt iti
“And it should not be said: ‘Even so, how would that not have the nature of vikalpa?’”
The gloss now raises the next objection. Even after accepting that consciousness must have vimarśa or parāmarśa, one may still ask: if there is reflexive apprehension, if awareness inwardly touches or knows itself, why is that not already vikalpa?
This is a fair objection. Because vikalpa also involves a kind of grasping. It determines, fixes, and articulates: “this is blue,” “I know this,” “this is that.” So the opponent presses: if pure consciousness has self-apprehension, are we not already admitting conceptuality into it?
Abhinava keeps the distinction strict. The mere presence of self-apprehension does not make something vikalpa. Otherwise consciousness would face a false choice: either be inert like crystal, or become conceptual thought. Abhinava rejects both. Consciousness is self-apprehending, but that self-apprehension is not yet conceptual determination.
So this objection prepares the final clarification: vikalpa requires the flashing forth of difference. It is not simply awareness knowing itself. It is determinate cognition structured through duality. That is what the next line will state.
It is not vikalpa because difference has not flashed forth
na vikalpatulyatvaṃ - bhedānullāsāditi |
“It is not equivalent to vikalpa, because difference has not flashed forth.”
Abhinava now gives the clean answer. Parāmarśa or vimarśa does not become vikalpa simply because it is self-apprehending. It becomes vikalpa only when bheda, difference, has flashed forth — when cognition has taken the form of a determinate split: this and that, subject and object, one thing distinguished from another.
Here, that has not happened. The self-apprehension of consciousness is present, but bheda-anullāsa remains — difference has not arisen into explicit display. So this is not conceptual cognition. It is living self-presence before the structure of conceptual division.
This is the decisive distinction:
Parāmarśa means awareness inwardly knows or touches itself.
Vikalpa means awareness has moved into determinate cognition structured by difference.
A simple example: before the mind says “I see blue,” there is already a living flash of awareness. That flash is not dead. It is self-present. But it has not yet formed the dual judgment “I, here, know that blue object there.” Once that structure appears, vikalpa has arisen. Before that, there is self-apprehending awareness without conceptual division.
So Abhinava is avoiding both mistakes. Pure consciousness is not inert, because it has vimarśa. But it is not conceptual, because bheda has not flashed forth. This is the exact middle: living non-conceptual self-awareness.
I-reflexive awareness is not vikalpa
tathā coktaṃ
ahaṃpratyavamarśo yaḥ prakāśātmāpi vāgvapuḥ |
nāsau vikalpaḥ sa hyukto dvayākṣepī viniścayaḥ ||
iti |]
“And so it has been said:
‘That aham-pratyavamarśa, the reflexive awareness “I,” though it is light-nature and speech-bodied, is not vikalpa; for vikalpa is said to be a determinate cognition that implies duality.’”
The supporting verse now states the distinction in its strongest form. There is aham-pratyavamarśa — the reflexive awareness of “I.” It is prakāśātmā, light-nature, and even vāg-vapuḥ, speech-bodied. That is already a delicate statement, because one might think that anything connected with vāk, speech, must already be conceptual. But the verse says no: nāsau vikalpaḥ — this is not vikalpa.
Why? Because vikalpa is dvayākṣepī viniścayaḥ — a determinate cognition that throws in or implies duality. It establishes something in a structure of two: knower and known, this and that, subject and object, one thing distinguished from another. Vikalpa does not merely shine; it fixes. It determines by division.
But aham-pratyavamarśa is not that. It is the primordial “I” self-apprehension of consciousness, before it has split into a determinate judgment such as “I know this object.” It is self-presence, not conceptual self-description. It is not the ego saying “I am this person.” It is the luminous self-touch of awareness as “I,” prior to biography, thought, and object-division.
This completes the argument of the chunk. Abhinava has shown that pratibhā is not unestablished, because all cognition and memory require it. It is avikalpa, because it does not depend on convention-learning. Yet it is not inert, because consciousness necessarily includes innate parāmarśa or vimarśa. And that self-apprehension is still not vikalpa, because bheda has not flashed forth. Vikalpa begins only where duality is implied in determinate cognition.
So the final distinction is clear:
Prakāśa — consciousness shines.
Vimarśa / parāmarśa — consciousness inwardly knows its own shining.
Aham-pratyavamarśa — this self-knowing has the form of primordial “I.”
Vikalpa — later determinate cognition structured by duality.
That is the clean line. Consciousness is not a dead light, but neither is its self-awareness conceptual thought.
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